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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
Volume VI AUTUMN-WINTER 1956 Number 1
REPUDIATION OF CONTRACT-THE POST-
RESTATEMENT CASES
ARTHUR ANDERSON
HE STATEMENT IS sometimes seen in the books that a repudiation
of a contract entitles the injured party to take one of three
courses of action, namely, (1) he may sue at once for anticipa-
tory breach, or (2) he may "rescind" and sue for restitution, or (3)
he may "refuse to accept" the repudiation, thereby "keeping the con-
tract alive for the benefit of both parties," and postpone any action for
damages until the date fixed for performance.
A study of the reported cases decided in the United States since the
Restatement of Contracts was promulgated in 1932, which were con-
cerned with the repudiation of a contract, shows, however, that the
consequences of a repudiation are far more extensive than the list of
three courses of action suggests.
I. THE NATURE OF A REPUDIATION
A repudiation of a contract is a manifestation by a promisor that he
wilfully is going to commit a breach of the contract in the future.
This manifestation usually is by spoken or written words, but may be
made by other conduct; it usually is addressed to the promisee but
may be made to a third party beneficiary or to an assignee of the
promisee.' It is grammatically in the future tense and may be viewed as
a non-binding promise to break the contract. A promisor who has al-
ready fully performed is incapable of repudiating.2
1 Bonde v. Weber, 6 I. 2d 365, 128 N.E. 2d 883 (1955) (repudiation was made to
assignees); Rest., Contracts § 318, Comment f (1932).2 Minez v. Cosmocolor Corp., 126 N.J. Eq. 544, 545, 10 A. 2d 464, 465 (1940) ("The
basis of the counterclaim is the assertion that complainant repudiated his agreement...
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No case is known of a repudiation of so trifling a part of a contract
that the repudiation amounted only to a prospective immaterial
breach. The element of wilfulness is strongly influential in determin-
ing the materiality of any breach. It accordingly will be taken for
granted that a repudiation constitutes a prospective material breach.
Whether the speaker's words or conduct are a repudiation depends
not upon his subjective state of mind but rather upon his objective
manifestations:
It was error for the court to charge in effect that defendants' intention would
control in determining whether there was an anticipatory breach .... Not de-
fendants' intention, but their words and acts communicated to plaintiff, should
control.8
The breaking of a contract is "an unlawful act,"4 and so also is a
repudiation. Just as a party has no "right" to break, so he has no
"right" to repudiate, a contract. The view expressed by one court
that, "This was an executory contract. The defendant had the right to
repudiate it . . . being subject to the consequent damages," 5 must be
considered unsound. The severe consequences, which will be seen
usually to follow a repudiation, show that a repudiator is no favorite of
the law. In a notable case, the court commented upon the repudiator's
character:
It is to be observed in passing that the court views with suspicion the testi-
mony of the defendant. He is not an unwary man to be taken in by the machina-
tions of designing cannery agents and representatives. His background evidences
a wily appreciation of business relationships in a variety of forms. Former
waiter, dealer in rugs, with an instinct for a sharp transaction, he gives the
obvious impression of a man who . . . preferring to gamble as it were, upon
the tenuous possibility of greater prices, refuses to conform to the terms of a
contract openly and legally binding upon him.6
After a careful search among the post-Restatement American cases,
it is believed correct to say that in every instance, where a court has
said that a promisor has repudiated, it has also appeared that the
However . . . complainant could not effectively have repudiated his agreement.
Complainant had already completely carried out his contract by the execution of the
assignment and his obligation to defendant thereupon ceased").
8 Forward Publications, Inc. v. International Pictures, Inc., 277 App. Div. 846, 98
N.Y.S. 2d 139, 140 (1st Dep't, 1950).
. 4 Ahmed Angullia Bin Hadjee Mohamed Salleh Angullia v. Estate and Trust Agen-
cies (1927), Limited, [1938] A.C. 624 (P.C.), noted in 55 L.Q.Rev. 1 (1939).
5 Western Advertising Co. v. Midwest Laundries, Inc., 61 S.W. 2d 251, 253 (St. Louis
Ct. App., 1933).
6 Hunt Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho, 98 F. Supp. 267, 270 (N.D. Calif., 1951).
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promisor's proposed non-performance was wilful. In other words, it
is believed to be the law in the United States that wilfulness is an in-
dispensable element in a repudiation. This is the basis for an earlier
statement that a repudiation is a manifestation by a promisor that he
wilfully is going to commit a breach of the contract in the future.
II. WHAT FACTS CONSTITUTE A REPUDIATION
A repudiation requires an affirmative disavowal of the contract and,
therefore, the mere silence of an employer when asked about unpaid
salary, 7 and the mere inaction of a promisor who had failed for six
years to perform his promise to execute a will containing a specified
bequest,8 were held properly not to be repudiations.
The kind of repudiation which occurs most frequently is simply a
statement or a writing to the effect that the speaker is not going to
perform as promised, and a court seldom has any difficulty in charac-
terizing such a statement or writing as a repudiation. A startling ex-
ception appears, however, in a recent Oklahoma case,' where a buyer
of nuts and bolts wrote to the seller a letter concluding as follows:
The Oklahoma Tax Commission does not expect to use any nuts and bolts
such as those described in the instrument above referred to [the contract] and
will not accept delivery of such from you.
This is written to you so that you may take such steps as you deem advisable
to protect any interest you may consider you have in the matter.
The foregoing seems to be as clear and definite a repudiation as would
likely be seen in modern business correspondence, but the court, rely-
ing mainly upon language from Corpus Juris and an 1872 United
States Supreme Court quotation from Benjamin on Sales, said:
We deem it to be too manifest to require any discussion that the letter, in
contemplation of law, is insufficient to constitute a repudiation.
A less common but equally effective type of repudiation is a denial
that a contract exists,10 or that an option is still open." On the other
hand, no repudiation is found in a party's questioning the validity of
an agreement so long as he does not threaten to discontinue his per-
t Shaughnessy v. D'Antoni, 100 F. 2d 422 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938).
8 Harmon v. Aughtry, 226 S.C. 371, 85 S.E. 2d 284 (1955).
9 Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Fortinberry Co., 201 Okla. 537, 207 P. 2d 301 (1949).
10 Compania Engraw Commercial E. Industrial S. A. v. Schenley Distillers Corp.,
181 F. 2d 876 (C.A. 9th, 1950). Accord: Eugene B. Smith & Co. v. Russek, 212 F. 2d
338 (C.A. 5th, 1954).
11 Raffensperger v. Van Kooy, 260 Wis. 589, 51 N.W. 2d 488 (1952).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
formance thereunder, 12 nor in his suggestion that the other party con-
sent to a mutual rescission of the contract,13 nor in his request in good
faith that the other party help him to get materials needed for the per-
formance of the contract,14 nor in his making an honest and not un-
reasonable contention that a clause in the contract had operated to
discharge it.'5 The line, between a denial that a contract exists and a
contention that a clause in the contract had operated to discharge it,
is obviously faint, but there probably will be no great difficulty in de-
ciding that the speaker did or did not manifest a wilful intention not
to perform.
Another manner of repudiation is by making an unwarranted de-
mand and at the same time asserting that no further performance will
be rendered unless the other party complies with the demand. For
example, a builder declares that he will build no more unless the
owner makes payments earlier than required by the contract,, or a
printer announces that he will stop work unless the customer makes a
new contract with him at a higher price,17 or a seller of goods states
that he will deliver the goods only at a price higher than that named
in the contract," or a seller of land demands payment of a part of the
price before it is due,'9 or a seller of land insists that the buyer sign
a "property management agreement" not mentioned in the contract,2
or a buyer of land insists that the seller give an assurance that the pres-
ent method of sewage disposal will continue to be permissible, 21 or a
buyer of land raises sham objections to the seller's title, 22 or a dry well
contributor states that he will not make his $2 5,000 payment unless the
well owner makes certain unnecessary tests of the well at a cost of
12 Eisenberg v. Rodless Decorations, Inc., 106 N.Y.S. 2d 822 (S.Ct. N.Y. County,
1951).
13 Wonalancet Co. v. Banfield, 116 Conn. 582, 165 AtI. 785 (1933).
14 McCloskey & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F. 2d 101 (C.A. 3rd, 1955).
15 Preston v. Love, 240 S.W. 2d 486 (Civ. App. Tex., 1951).
16Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 67 N.E. 2d 673 (1946).
17 Steinberg Press, Inc. v. Charles Henry Publications, Inc., 68 N.Y.S. 2d 793 (S. Ct.,
1947).
Is Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Indiana Gas & Chemical Corp., 129 F. 2d 17
(C.C.A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied 317 U.S. 678; Vermillion v. Marvel Merchandising
Co., 314 Ky. 196, 234 S.W. 2d 673 (1950); Swartz v. Lieberman, 323 Mass. 109, 80 N.E.
2d 5 (1948).
19 Menako v. Kassien, 265 Wis. 269, 61 N.W. 2d 332 (1953); cf. Tancred v. Beppler,
15 N.J. Super. 394, 83 A. 2d 470 (1951).
20Johnson v. Goldberg, 130 Cal.App. 2d 571, 279 P. 2d 131 (1955).
21 Helfgort v. LaBar, 30 North.Co.Rep. 100 (Pa., 1945).
22 Ashkenazy v. R. M. Bradley & Co., 328 Mass. 242, 103 N.E. 2d 251 (1952).
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$75,000.23 Each such statement is a repudiation, since the speaker is
manifesting that he will not perform the contract as made.
Whether a declaration of impossibility is a repudiation should be
mentioned. The Restatement provides that a statement, made "with-
out justification" to the effect that "the promisor will not or cannot
substantially perform his contractual duties," is a repudiation. 4 To
the extent that this language suggests that a good faith declaration of
impossibility is a repudiation, it appears to be inaccurate. If the im-
possibility is of a type which discharges the promisor's duty (destruc-
tion of the subject matter, death or illness, local law) ,25 a declaration
of impossibility is not "without justification" and hence not a repudia-
tion. If the impossibility is of a type which does not discharge the
promisor (for example, subjective impossibility and impossibility by
foreign law) ,26 the essential element of wilfulness is missing and hence
the declaration is not a repudiation. It is accordingly suggested that
the foregoing provision be read with the limitation that a good faith
declaration of impossibility is not a repudiation.
The typical denial of liability by an insurance company, on the
ground of fraud, misrepresentation, non-payment of premiums,
failure to file proofs, or nonexistence of disability, is not a disavowal
or denunciation of the policy and not a repudiation of the contract."'
The exceptional case of a repudiation by an insurance company can
occur, of course, as where a mutual assessment life insurance company
increased the annual premium from $73.06 to $398.26,2s and where a
23 Humphrey v. Placid Oil Co., 142 F. Supp. 246 (E. D. Tex., 1956).
24 Rest., Contracts S 318 (a) (1932).
25 Ibid., at § 5 460, 459, 458.
20 Ibid., at § 455 as to subjective impossibility; as to impossibility by foreign law,
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellschaft, 15 F. Supp.
927 (S. D. N.Y., 1936), aff'd on opinion below 84 F. 2d 993 (C.C.A. 2d), cert. denied
299 U.S. 585. But cf. Brooks v. Yawkey, 200 F. 2d 663 (C.A. 1st, 1953).
27 New York Life Insurance Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936) (Cardozo, J., said
at page 676: "Repudiation there was none as the term is known to the law. Petitioner
did not disclaim the intention or the duty to shape its conduct in accordance with the
provisions of the contract. Far from repudiating those provisions, it appealed to their
authority and endeavored to apply them."); Mobley v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
295 U.S. 632 (1935); Kimel v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 71 F. 2d 921 (C.C.A.
10th, 1934).
2 8 National Life Co. v. Wolverton, 163 S.W. 2d 654 (Civ. App. Tex., 1942) (page 656:
"An unauthorized attempt on its part to arbitrarily increase the assessments ... consti-
tuted a repudiation. . . "). Accord: Kentucky Home Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Duling, 190 F. 2d 797 (C.A. 6th, 1951) (company changed plan of computing premiums
from the step rate basis to the attained age basis); Kentucky Home Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Rogers, 196 Tenn. 641, 270 S.W. 2d 188 (1954).
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company took the policy from the insured and declared that it would
accept no more premiums and would pay no more sick benefits.2 19
The foregoing repudiations have been by written or spoken words,
but repudiation also may be by conduct. The most common example
is the case where a party, who has contracted to convey certain lands
or goods to the plaintiff, instead conveys the property to a third per-
son.3 0 As the Restatement says, "the action of the seller not only
creates a probable inability to perform but is also a manifestation of
an intention not to perform."'"
A will does not transfer property until death, but it has been said in
an obiter dictum that the mere making of a will is a repudiation if it
disposes of property contrary to the maker's contractual promises . 2
Usually a conveyance to a third person has no meaning except a re-
pudiation, but it is of course possible for a different explanation to
exist. For instance, where the title was conveyed to a corporation at
the time and apparently as a part of a refinancing arrangement, and
the corporation thereafter offered and stood ready to convey a good
title to the buyer, the court properly held, in effect, that there was
no repudiation.3
Intention not to perform can, of course, be manifested by conduct
of various kinds. In a notable case,3 4 the sellers of land including a
house promised to convey title and possession as soon as they "have
found a suitable place to live." The sellers apparently looked unsuc-
cessfully for over two years, but then they began to make permanent
improvements upon the premises which they had contracted to sell.
This conduct stirred the buyers for they immediately sued for spe-
29 Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Shaw, 139 Tex. 434, 163 S.W. 2d 376 (1942).
Accord: Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Baber, 168 Tenn. 347, 79 S.W. 2d 36
(1935).
80 Saliba v. Brackin, 260 Ala. 103, 69 So. 2d 267 (1953); Nelson v. Fernando Nelson &
Sons, 5 Cal. 2d 511, 55 P. 2d 859 (1936); Crane v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co.,
6 Cal. App. 2d 361, 44 P. 2d 455 (1935); Mitchell v. Aimo, 124 Cal. App. 508, 12 P. 2d
1063 (1932); Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 74 N.E. 2d 137 (1947); Trisch v. Fairman,
334 Mich. 432, 54 N.W. 2d 621 (1952); In re Vaughn's Estate, 156 N.Y. Misc. 577, 282
N.Y. Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct., 1935), aff'd 248 App. Div. 730, 289 N.Y. Supp. 825 (2d Dep't,
1936); Pappas v. Crist, 223 N.C. 265, 25 S.E. 2d 850 (1943); Dillard v. Ceaser, 206 Okla.
304, 243 P. 2d 356 (1952); Slaughter v. Roark, 244 S.W. 2d 698 (Civ. App. Tex., 1951).
See Brimmer v. Union Oil Co., 81 F. 2d 437 (C.C.A. 10th, 1936), cert. denied 298 U.S.
668; Van Meter v. Norris, 318 Pa. 137, 177 AtI. 799 (1935).
31 Rest., Contracts § 284, Comment a (1932).
32 Matheson v. Gullickson, 222 Minn. 369, 24 N.W. 2d 704 (1946).
33 Bruffy v. Baker, 69 App. D.C. 266, 100 F. 2d 439 (1938).
34 Glover v. Grubbs, 367 Pa. 257, 80 A. 2d 75 (1951).
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cific performance. The court described the sellers' conduct as an "ob-
vious and express repudiation of the agreement, ' '3 and granted the
relief as sought. A seller of land may repudiate by returning the buy-
er's earnest money check, 30 and a buyer may do so by stopping pay-
ment thereon. 7 A seller of land or goods likewise may repudiate by
wrongfully retaking or attempting to retake possession of the prop-
erty. 8
Another form of repudiation by conduct is by disabling oneself
from rendering the required performance. This is seen clearly in a
case where the plaintiff, who had just bought a sewer pipe factory,
hired the defendant as his exclusive agent to sell pipe. Before plaintiff's
factory was ready to operate, defendant bought a sewer pipe factory
of his own. Defendant thereafter could be expected to steer the most
desirable business to his own factory and the small-profit and poor-
credit-risk business to plaintiff's: a manifestation of intention by de-
fendant not to perform for plaintiff as a proper exclusive selling
agent.89 In a dramatic case, Braddock had a contract to box Schmeling
on June 3, and later made a contract to box Joe Louis on June 22. The
court said in a dictum: "There was practical repudiation for the reason
that a heavyweight boxer, through sheer physical limitations, cannot
engage in two major contests involving the title of World's Heavy-
weight Champion within nineteen days."4° Complete disability to per-
form was achieved by a corporate lessee of land under a 99 year lease
when it voluntarily caused its own dissolution,4 and practically com-
plete disability occurred when a seller of land at the price of $137,000,
mortgaged this and other land for a total of $500,000.42
By way of summary, it may be said that a repudiation of a contract
is a manifestation by a promisor by words or conduct that he wilfully
is going to commit a breach of the contract in the future. There usually
is little difficulty in deciding whether particular words or conduct are
a repudiation and that decision accordingly is usually the lesser prob-
35 Ibid., at 259 and 76.
3 6 Allardice v. McCain, 375 Pa. 528, 101 A. 2d 385 (1953).
87 Duke v. Wasserman, 191 N.Y. Misc. 849, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 582 (Sup. Ct., 1948);
Tudesco v. Wilson, 163 Pa. Super. 352, 60 A. 2d 388 (1948).
38 Carl v. McDonald, 60 Ariz. 170, 133 P. 2d 1013 (1943); Bonde v. Weber, 6 111. 2d
365, 128 N.E. 2d 883 (1955); Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wash. 2d 70, 240 P. 2d 931 (1952).
89W. H. Kirkland Co. v. King, 248 Ala. 643, 29 So. 2d 141 (1947).
40 Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F. 2d 924, 926 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1937).
41 South Main Akron, Inc. v. Lynn Realty, Inc., 106 N.E. 2d 325 (Ohio App., 1951).
42 Miswald-Wilde Co. v. Armory Realty Co., 210 Wis. 53, 243 N.W. 492 (1932).
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lem in a repudiation case. The more important problem, ordinarily, is
the matter which will now be taken up, namely, the consequences of
a repudiation.
Ill. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A REPUDIATION
1. The injured party may sue for damages at once under the doc-
trine of anticipatory breach.-The most familiar consequence of a re-
pudiation of a contract is that the doctrine of anticipatory breach now
becomes applicable and permits the injured party to sue immediately
for breach of contract,48 using, under common law pleading, the ac-
tion of special assumpsit. This form of action had originated in con-
nection with, and until 1853 had been restricted to, cases of actual
breach of promise, but in that year, in the case of Hochster v. De La
Tour,44 the plaintiff recovered judgment in a suit filed on May 22, al-
though the defendant's performance was not to begin until June 1.
Williston has shown the unsoundness of that decision at the time it
was rendered, 45 and at the present time the principal argument in its
support is that it is a great convenience to the injured party to be
allowed to sue at once. This convenience may be offset, however, by
the inconvenience and injustice to the repudiator in being sued for
breach of contract before he has committed one, by the illogic of
allowing a remedy where theory says that no actionable wrong has
occurred, and by the practical difficulties encountered in attempting
to determine the amount of the injured party's damages. The view,
that a contract contains some kind of a promise not to disturb the
relation and that this promise is broken by a repudiation, is believed
to be fallacious: such a promise does not exist in common understand-
48Bercut v. Park, Benziger & Co., 150 F. 2d 731 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945); Nelson v.
Fernando Nelson & Sons, 5 Cal. 2d 511, 55 P. 2d 859 (1936); Crown Products Co. v.
California Food Products Corp., 77 Cal. App. 2d 543, 175 P. 2d 861 (1947); Crane v.
East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 6 Cal. App. 2d 361, 44 P. 2d 455 (1935); Parker v.
King, 68 Ga. App. 672, 23 S.E. 2d 575 (1942); Pappas v. Crist, 223 N.C. 265, 25 S.E. 2d
850 (1943); Gilmore v. American Gas Machine Co., 129 N.E. 2d 93 (C.P. Ohio, 1952);
Benedict v. Harris, 158 Ore. 613, 77 P. 2d 442 (1938); Tudesco v. Wilson, 163 Pa.
Super. 352, 60 A. 2d 388 (1948); Kentucky Home Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Rogers,
196 Tenn. 641, 270 S.W. 2d 188 (1954); Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Baber, 168
Tenn. 347, 79 S.W. 2d 36 (1935). See Barnebey v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 65 F. 2d 864
(C.C.A. 8th, 1933); Perry v. Shaw, 152 Fla. 765, 13 So. 2d 811 (1943); Gilliland v.
Mercantile Investment & Holding Co., 147 Fla. 613, 3 So. 2d 148 (1941); Lang v. Todd,
148 Neb. 726, 28 N.W. 2d 434 (1947); Harmon v. Aughtry, 226 S.C. 371, 85 S.F. 2d
284 (1955).
44 2 E. & B. 678 (Q.B., 1853).
45 5 Williston, Contracts SS 1313-1321 (rev. ed., 1937).
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ing," and, if it did, there would be no need for a doctrine of antici-
patory breach. Two facts persist which must constantly raise a doubt
whether Hochster v. De La Tour was correctly decided: first, the
doctrine still is restricted to the original fact situation of a bilateral
contract executory on both sides, and, second, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts steadfastly maintains that the doctrine is not
the law in that Commonwealth.47 This does not mean that repudia-
tions do not occur in Massachusetts or that a repudiation has no legal
effect there, but only that no action for breach of contract will lie
before the date for performance. Six notable cases involving repudia-
tion have come up in Massachusetts in the last fourteen years, and it
would be hard to show that the unavailability of the doctrine of antic-
ipatory breach hampered the Court in its adjudging of them.48
The doctrine is believed to be the law in all other American juris-
dictions, with Maine in doubt.49 Florida and Nebraska joined the ma-
jority in recent years. °
It is well established that an action for anticipatory breach will lie
only if the situation is as it was in Hochster v. De La Tour: the con-
tract must be bilateral and still executory on both sides.5 1 This means
that if the innocent party has not fully performed he is given an im-
40 Such a subsidiary promise is conceded to exist, however, in an engagement to
marry. Rest., Contracts, S 318, Illustration 7.
47 Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 73, 67 N.E. 2d 673, 675 (1946) ("This principle
[that the innocent party may rescind] must not be confused with the doctrine of
recovery for anticipatory breach, rejected in this Commonwealth . . .").
48 Ashkenazy v. R. M. Bradley & Co., 328 Mass. 242, 103 N.E. 2d 251 (1952); Schilling
v. Levin, 328 Mass. 2, 101 N.E. 2d 360 (1951); Sennott v. Cobb's Pedigreed Chicks, Inc.,
324 Mass. 9, 84 N.E. 2d 466 (1949); Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 74 N.E. 2d 137
(1947); Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 67 N.E. 2d 673 (1946); Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker
Corp., 314 Mass. 351, 50 N.E. 2d 59 (1943).
495 Williston, Contracts § 1314 note 6 (rev. ed., 1937).
5o See Perry v. Shaw, 152 Fla. 765, 13 So. 2d 811 (1943); Gilliland v. Mercantile In-
vestment & Holding Co., 147 Fla. 613, 3 So. 2d 148 (1941); Lang v. Todd, 148 Neb. 726,
28 N.W. 2d 434 (1947).
51 City of Hampton v. United States, 218 F. 2d 401 (C.A. 4th, 1955); Brown Paper
Mill Co. v. Irvin, 146 F. 2d 232 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944); Brimmer v. Union Oil Co. of Cali-
fornia, 81 F. 2d 437 (C.C.A. 10th, 1936), cert. denied 298 U.S. 668; Mannheimer v. Neder-
landsche Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatschappij, 6 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. N.Y., 1934);
Sheketoff v. Prevedine, 133 Conn. 389, 51 A. 2d 922 (1947); Mabery v. Western Casualty
& Surety Co., 173 Kan. 586, 250 P. 2d 824 (1952); Upham v. Shattuck, 151 Kan. 966, 101
P. 2d 901 (1940); Nolan Motors, Inc. v. Charbonneau, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (S.Ct., 1938).
See Operators' Oil Co. v. Barbre, 65 F. 2d 857 (C.C.A. 10th, 1933); Douglas v. Quick,
5 Conn. Supp. 128 (1937); Indian River Islands Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 253
App. Div. 549, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 860 (1st Dep't, 1938). Contra: Pollack v. Pollack, 46 S.W.
2d292 (Comm. App. Tex., 1932).
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mediate cause of action for anticipatory breach, but if he has fully
performed he must delay suit until the date for performance. In
neither case can he accelerate money payments, but in the former case
he has an immediate action for damages for breach of contract and can
recover, in substance, the value of the contract, even though the
.repudiator's principal promise is to make money payments. 52 In other
words, a party who has not performed in full has a legal right which
a full performer does not. Only one judicial suggestion, that the law
of anticipatory breach should be extended -to the full performance
cases, has been seen.
The problem has arisen also in the case of a repudiation of a lease.
A lease is probably more a conveyance of land than a contract, but
viewed as a contract, its main features are the tenant's promise to pay
rent in exchange for the landlord's act of conveying an estate in land.
In this aspect, the landlord fully performs at the outset, the doctrine
of anticipatory breach is not applicable, and a repudiating tenant is
liable only for the rent due at the time of filing suit.54 In the famous
case of Hawkinson v. Johnston, however, the court said that the land-
lord's covenant of quiet enjoyment rendered the lease bilateral and
executory on both sides. 55
2. The injured party may. be given equitable relief.-The peculiar-
ity of Hochster v. De La Tour was that the injured party was permit-
ted to maintain a premature action for damages for breach of con-
tract. In some recent cases, however, the injured party has instead
filed a suit for specific performance-after the repudiation and before
the date fixed for performance-and has been awarded a decree that
the defendant must perform on the due date. (No case has been seen
where performance before the due date was decreed.) Examples of
such decrees are: a repudiating seller of land was ordered to convey
when the date fixed for conveyance should arrive,56 a peach farmer,
52 In Hochster v. De La Tour, 2 E.&B. 678 (Q.B., 1853), the defendant's principal
promise was to pay money, but the plaintiff had a cause of action for damages.
53 Pollack v. Pollack, 46 S.W. 2d 292 (Comm. App. Tex., 1932).
54 Landlord recovered only the rent due at time of filing suit: Williams v. Aeroland
Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114, 20 So. 2d 346 (1944); Jordon v. Nickell, 253 S.W. 2d 237 (Ky.,
1952). See: Cerruti v. Burdick, 130 Conn. 284, 33 A. 2d 333 (1943); Marshall v. Fraser,
258 S.W. 2d 12 (Ky., 1953). Contra, allowing recovery of rent due after date of filing
suit: Sagamore Corp. v. Willcutt, 120 Conn. 315, 180 Atl. 464 (1935) (the court cited
Rest., Contracts S 316 (1932), but its opinion does not conform thereto); Galvin v.
Lovell, 257 Wis. 82, 42 N.W. 2d 456 (1950).
55 122 F. 2d 724 (C.C.A. 8th, 1941), cert. denied 314 U.S. 694.
56 Bonde v. Weber, 6 111. 2d 365, 128 N.E. 2d 883 (1955). Accord:. Saliba v. Brackin,
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who had contracted to sell his peaches to plaintiff for five years and
who repudiated after two years, was ordered to deliver his peaches to
plaintiff for the following three years, 7 and a plaintiff in a tort case,
who made and later repudiated an accord, had his tort case dismissed
by the court and was ordered to perform specifically the accord. 58
Some reason exists for believing that the remedies of injunction,59 ap-
pointment of a receiver, 6° and equitable lien,"1 are also obtainable by
the injured party.
3. The injured party may be given a declaratory judgment.-
Another possible remedy for a repudiation of a contract, far removed
in legal theory from an action in special assumpsit for damages, is a
proceeding for a declaratory judgment under the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act62 or under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
The Federal Act was employed in a 1940 case, where a joint ven-
ture had produced nothing but losses and the defendant had denied all
liability, "in effect repudiating the entire contract." The plaintiff filed
an action for a declaration that the contract was valid, and the court
overruled the defendant's motion to dismiss, saying that the procedure
was a proper one."
The Uniform Act was relied upon in a 1954 case in a state court,
where again there was a repudiation of a contract for carrying on a
joint venture. The court, two justices dissenting, held that the pro-
cedure was proper and that the plaintiff was entitled to restitution for
moneys expended and services rendered, the amount to be determined
in supplementary proceedings. 4
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, § 3, provides that, "A
260 Ala. 103, 69 So. 2d 267 (1953); Glover v. Grubbs, 367 Pa. 257, 80 A. 2d 75 (1951).
Contra: Ehrlich v. Teague, 209 Ga. 164, 71 S.E. 2d 232 (1952), criticized 5 Corbin, Con-
tracts § 1141, pocket part, note 32, 33 (1951).
57Hunt Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho, 98 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Calif., 1951).
58 Landau v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 364 Mo. 1134, 273 S.W. 2d 255 (1954).
59 Eastwood v. Eastwood, 167 Kan. 471, 207 P. 2d 393 (1949). But cf. Tompkins v.
Hoge, 114 Cal. App. 2d 257, 250 P. 2d 174 (1952).
60 See South Main Akron, Inc. v. Lynn Realty, Inc., 106 N.E. 2d 325 (Ohio App.,
1951).
61 Tancred v. Beppler, 15 N.J. Super. 394,83 A. 2d 470 (1951).
6268 Stat. 890 (1954) as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. S 2201 (1955): "In a case of actual con-
troversy ... any court. . . upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.... Any
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment ......
63 Dunleer Co. v. Minter Homes Corp., 33 F. Supp. 242 (S.D. W.Va., 1940).
64 West v. Peoples First National Bank & Trust Co., 378 Pa. 275, 106 A. 2d 427 (1954).
Accord: W. H. Kirkland Co. v. King, 248 Ala. 643, 29 So. 2d 141 (1947).
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contract may be construed either before or after there has been a
breach thereof." This section seems expressly to authorize a declara-
tory judgment after a repudiation, but no case applying it to a repudi-
ation of a contract has been seen.
4. The repudiation qwill be nullified if the repudiator retracts it.-A
retraction is the converse of a repudiation: it is a manifestation by the
promisor that he will perform his promise when the due date arrives.
It usually is in the form of spoken or written words to the effect that
the promisor will perform as promised,65 but it may consist instead of
regaining title to essential property,6 or of making a new agreement
with the promisee for a later performance date,6 7 or, as occurred in
one case, of rendering full performance of the repudiated promise.68
It appears to be true that such a retraction completely nullifies the
repudiation and fully restores the repudiator's rights under the con-
tract-even to the extent of now permitting him lawfully to terminate
the contract by using a 90-day cancellation clause contained therein.69
For a retraction to be operative, it must be communicated to the in-
jured party before he has materially changed his position, 0 or has
filed suit on the basis of the repudiation. 71 A retraction thereafter is
believed to have no legal effect.
An insincere or pretended retraction, that is, a retraction made
without an intent manifested in good faith actually to perform the
contract as made, is no retraction at all. For example, in a case previ-
ously mentioned, the plaintiff, who had just bought a sewer pipe fac-
65 Refrigeradora Del Noroeste, S.A. v. Appelbaum, 138 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ill., 1956);
Lang v. Todd, 148 Neb. 726, 28 N.W. 2d 434 (1947); Peeler v. Tarola Motor Car Co.,
170 Ore. 600, 134 P. 2d 105 (1943); Bayley v. Lewis, 39 Wash. 2d 464, 236 P. 2d 350
(1951); Walker v. Herke, 20 Wash. 2d 239, 147 P. 2d 255 (1944); Kentucky Natural Gas
Corp. v. Indiana Gas & Chemical Corp., 129 F. 2d 17 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942), cert. denied
317 U.S. 678 (semble).
66 In re Vaughn's Estate, 156 N.Y. Misc. 577, 282 N.Y. Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct., 1935),
aff'd 248 App. Div. 730, 289 N.Y. Supp. 825 (2d Dep't, 1936).
67 Wells v. Lee Builders, Inc., 99 A. 2d 620 (Del., 1953).
68Ford v. Thomas D. Mackey Co., 70 S.W. 2d 1021 (Civ. App. Tex., 1934).
69 Peeler v. Tarola Motor Car Co., 170 Ore. 600, 134 P. 2d 105 (1943). Accord: Re-
frigeradora Del Noroeste, S.A. v. Appelbaum, 138 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ill., 1956).
70 United States v. Seacoast Gas Co., 204 F. 2d 709 (C.A. 5th, 1953), cert. denied 346
U.S. 866 (injured buyer changed position by making a contract with another seller);
Freedman v. Rector, etc., 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P. 2d 629 (1951) (injured seller changed
position by selling the property to another); Nemanick v. Christensen, 87 Cal. App. 2d
844, 197 P. 2d 785 (1948); see Helfgott v. LaBar, 30 North. Co. Rep. 100 (Pa., 1945).
71 Crown Products Co. v. California Food Products Corp., 77 Cal. App. 2d 543, 175
P. 2d 861 (1947); Gilmore v. American Gas Machine Co., 129 N.E. 2d 93 (C.P. Ohio,
1952).
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tory, hired the defendant as his exclusive agent to sell pipe. De-
fendant's repudiation took the form of a purchase of a sewer pipe fac-
tory of his own. After plaintiff had filed a petition for a declaratory
judgment, defendant transferred his interest in the factory to his son-
in-law. The court held that this transfer was ineffective as a retrac-
tion, saying:
The disposition he made was open to serious contention that it was only
colorable. The sale was to his son-in-law.... The human influences which are
influential in such matters remained as before. 72
In another case, the injured party suspected that the retraction was
insincere, and accordingly stated that he would hold as security for
the repudiator-retractor's future performance the sum of about $200,-
000, this being the purchase price of goods previously delivered by
the repudiator to the injured party. The original repudiator thereupon
brought action for the $200,000, claiming that now the original in-
jured party was in default, and, since the retraction was not proven
to be in bad faith, the court entered judgment for the original repudi-
ator for $200,000, being the entire purchase price of the goods it had
delivered, and also held that it was not liable in damages for failing to
deliver any more.7" From the outcome of this case, it would seem to
be advantageous for the injured party to file suit for anticipatory
breach or make a material change of position as soon as a repudiation
occurs: in this way he will avoid having to contend with a possibly
insincere or pretended retraction.
5. The duties of both parties under the contract may become dis-
charged by a rescission by partially reluctant mutual assent.-A re-
pudiation includes a manifestation that the repudiator desires to end
the contract, and may be viewed as a proposal to rescind the contract
by mutual assent. The injured party may refuse to agree and the con-
tract will not be discharged. 4 On the other hand, the injured party
may give a fairly amicable though reluctant assent, 75 or he may make
a possibly angry assent in the form of a vigorous declaration that the
contract is terminated, 76 or he may indicate by conduct that he con-
72 W. H. Kirkland Co. v. King, 248 Ala. 643,647, 29 So. 2d 141, 144 (1947).
73Refrigeradora Del Noroeste, S.A. v. Appelbaum, 138 F. Supp. 354 (N.D., Ill., 1956).
74 Allardice v. McCain, 375 Pa. 528, 101 A. 2d 385 (1953).
75 Gui v. Pugh, 311 Ky. 90, 223 S.W. 2d 574 (1949); Harris v. Kirshner, 194 Md. 139,
70 A. 2d 47 (1949); Gibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 Atl. 826 (1937).
76 Fenwal, Inc. v. Montgomery, 193 F. 2d 404 (C.A. 9th, 1951); W. H. Kirkland Co.
v. King, 248 Ala. 643, 29 So. 2d 141 (1947); San Gabriel Valley Readi-Mixt v. Casillas,
298 P. 2d 76 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal., 1956); Hladik v. Noe, 214 Iowa 854, 243 N.W. 180
(1932); Ratcliffe v. Union Oil Co., 159 Ore. 221, 77 P. 2d 136 (1938).
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siders the contract at an end: 77 in either case a rescission by mutual
assent has occurred and'the contract is discharged. 8 An action on the
contract filed thereafter by the repudiator will fail, 79 and a proceeding
by the injured party to establish his contention that the contract is
discharged will succeed.80
6. If the contract is so discharged by a rescission by partially reluc-
tant mutual assent, restitution for benefits conferred may be obtained
by the injured party and possibly by the repudiator.-Upon the dis-
charge of the contract by a rescission by partially reluctant mutual
assent as aforesaid, and to prevent unjust enrichment, the injured
party is entitled to restitution for any benefits previously conferred
by him upon the repudiator. They would consist, for example, of
payments on account of a purchase price,' or of services rendered, 2
or of property delivered,8 by the injured party before the repudia-
tion. The injured party is entitled to the net value of the benefits con-
ferred by him, meaning that benefits received by him will be de-
ducted.84 It should be observed that a repudiation has this consequence
77 Carl v. McDonald, 60 Ariz. 170, 133 P. 2d 1013 (1943); Alder v. Drudis, 30 Cal. 2d
372, 182 P. 2d 195 (1947); Mitchell v. Aimo, 124 Cal. App. 508, 12 P. 2d 1063 (1932);
Givens v. Vaughn-Griffin Packing Co., 146 Fla. 575, 1 So. 2d 714 (1941); Danico v.
Ford, 230 Iowa 1237, 300 N.W. 547 (1941); Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566, 74 N.E. 2d
137 (1947); Trisch v. Fairman, 334 Mich. 432, 54 N.W. 2d 621 (1952); Tancred v. Bep-
pler, 15 N.J. Super. 394, 83 A. 2d 470 (1951); Smith v. Long, 183 Okla. 441, 83 P. 2d 167
(1938); Swick v. Mueller, 193 Ore. 668, 238 P. 2d 717 (1951); West v. Peoples First
National Bank & Trust Co., 378 Pa. 275, 106 A. 2d 427 (1954); Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wash.
2d 70, 240 P. 2d 931 (1952); Menako v. Kassien, 265 Wis. 269, 61 N.W. 2d 332 (1953).
See Paul v. Flannery, 128 N.J.L. 438, 26 A. 553 (E. & A., 1942).
78 San Gabriel Valley Readi-Mixt v. Casillas, 298 P. 2d 76 (Dist. Ct. App. Cal., 1956);
Rest., Contracts, § 406, Comment b (1932).
79 Fenwal, Inc. v. Montgomery, 193 F. 2d 404 (C.A. 9th, 1951); Nemanick v. Christen-
sen, 87 Cal. App. 2d 844, 197 P. 2d 785 (1948); Hladik v. Noe, 214 Iowa 854, 243 N.W.
180 (1932); Nevins v. Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 67 N.E. 2d 673 (1946); Ratcliffe v. Union
Oil Co., 159 Ore, 221, 77 P. 2d 136 (1938).
s0W. H. Kirkland Co. v. King, 248 Ala. 643, 29 So. 2d 141 (1947); Danico v. Ford,
230 Iowa 1237, 300 N.W. 547 (1941).
81 Carl v. McDonald, 60 Ariz. 170, 133 P. 2d 1013 (1943); Mitchell v. Aimo, 124 Cal.
A po. 508, 12 P. 2d 1063 (1932); Givens v. Vaughn-Griffin Packing Co., 146 Fla. 575,
1 2d 714 (1941); Tancred v. Beppler, 15 N.J. Super. 394, 83 A. 2d 470 (1951); Swick
v. Mueller, 193 Ore. 668, 238 P. 2d 717 (1951); Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wash. 2d 70, 240 P.
2d 931 (1952); Menako v. Kassien, 265 Wis. 269, 61 N.W. 2d 332 (1953). See Van Meter
v. Norris, 318 Pa. 137, 177 Atl. 799 (1935).
82 Johnson v. Starr, 321 Mass. 566,74 N.E. 2d 137 (1947); Trisch v. Fairman, 334 Mich.
432, 54 N.W. 2d 621 (1952); Smith v. Long, 183 Okla. 441, 83 P. 2d 167 (1938); West v.
Peoples First National Bank & Trust Co., 378 Pa. 275, 106 A. 2d 427 (1954). See Gallo-
way v. Eichells, 1 N.J. Super. 584, 62 A. 2d 499 (1948).
8 3 Alder v. Drudis, 30 Cal. 2d 372, 182 P. 2d 195 (1947).
84 Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wash. 2d 70, 240 P. 2d 931 (1952).
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in Massachusetts even though the premature action for damages is not
permitted.
When a repudiator seeks restitution, he normally encounters a doc-
trine that restitution should not be granted to a party wilfully in de-
fault. The Restatement precludes recovery by a repudiator by provid-
ing for restitution only if "the plaintiff's breach or non-performance
is not wilful and deliberate. "85 In the cases cited in the footnote,
however, the court made a point of finding a mutual assent, and there-
upon granted restitution to the repudiator."'
7. The duties of the injured party alone may become discharged.-
A repudiation is a manifestation that the repudiator will in the future
commit a material breach of his promise, and that the constructive
condition or condition implied in law to the injured party's duty, that
he receive substantial performance, will never occur. The injured
party may be expected, and is permitted, to take the repudiator at his
word and make a material change of position, and if he does so his
duties under the contract are discharged." The discharge of the in-
jured party does not occur until he changes his position, for until he
does, the repudiator may retract his repudiation and thereby nullify
it. It is probably true that filing a suit based on the repudiation has the
same effect in this connection as a material change of position.
8. The injured party, whose duties under the contract have been
discharged, may nevertheless recover damages from the repudiator.-
In the topic just discussed, the injured party alone was discharged, and
the repudiator accordingly remained liable for damages for breach of
contract.88 The fact that the repudiator remains liable for damages
shows that no rescission by mutual assent has occurred.
A common application of this rule is seen in the case of a contract
for the sale of land when the buyer, after paying earnest money, re-
pudiates. The seller is then entitled to retain the earnest money up to
8 5 Rest., Contracts § 357 (1) (a) (1932).
86 Guill v. Pugh, 311 Ky. 90, 223 S.W. 2d 574 (1949); Harris v. Kirshner, 194 Md. 139,
70 A. 2d 47 (1949); Gibula v. Sause, 173 Md. 87, 194 At. 826 (1937).
87Nemanick v. Christensen, 87 Cal. App. 2d 844, 197 P. 2d 785 (1948); Nevins v.
Ward, 320 Mass. 70, 67 N.E. 2d 673 (1946). Accord: Levitin v. Musicant, 15 N.J. Super.
256, 83 A. 2d 350 (1951). Rest., Contracts, §§ 280(1), 398 (1932).
88 Humphrey v. Placid Oil Co., 142 F. Supp. 246 (E. D. Tex., 1956); Kreisa v. Stod-
dard, 127 Cal. App. 2d 627, 274 P. 2d 164 (1954); City of Farrell v. H. Platt Co., 142 Pa.
Super. 242, 15 A. 2d 718 (1940); Amberg Granite Co. v. Marinette County, 247 Wis. 36,
18 N.W. 2d 496 (1945); Miswald-'Vilde Co. v. Armory Realty Co., 210 Wis. 53, 243
N.W. 492 (1932).
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at least the amount of his damages, 0 and since there usually is no
proof that the earnest money exceeds the damages, the result is that
the seller retains the entire earnest money.90
9. The repudiation may excuse a condition.-If a promise is subject
to a condition precedent or concurrent, the promisor is not under a
"duty of immediate performance" unless and until the condition
occurs or is excused. Upon the occurrence or excuse of the condition,
the promisor immediately is under a duty to perform the promise, and
if he fails to do so he is liable to an action for breach of contract.,"
One of the most important of the excuses is a repudiation by the
promisor.9 2 This rule actually is a particular application of the prin-
ciple that a condition is excused if the promisor prevents or hinders its
occurrence. 3 When a promisor declares that he will not perform his
promise in any event, the natural consequence is that the promisee dis-
continues any effort he may have been making to bring about the
occurrence of the condition. If such discontinuance of efforts results
in the non-occurrence of the condition, it is fair to say that the
promisor is responsible therefor, and the legal effect is that the con-
dition is excused.
The cases fall into four groups:
First: Where the condition is a fact under the control of the prom-
isee, a repudiation excuses the condition, but the promisee should be
required to show that he would have caused the condition to occur
had there been no repudiation. The condition has been held to be ex-
cused in numerous cases involving such facts as the act of tendering
or paying the price of land9 4 or goods 5 by a certain date, or the acts
89 Sheffield v. Paul T. Stone, Inc., 68 App. D.C. 378, 98 F. 2d 250 (1938); Schwartz v.
Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W. 2d 489 (1953).
90 Sabghir v. Ginsburg, 51 A. 2d 308 (Mun. C.A., D.C., 1947); Earlin v. Mors, 1 N.J.
336, 63 A. 2d 531 (1949); Bernstein v. Rosenzweig, 1 N.J. Super. 48, 62 A. 2d 147 (1948).
Accord: Mitchell v. Ralph D. Cohn, Inc., 52 A. 2d 631 (Mun. C.A., D.C., 1947).
91 Rest., Contracts, § 250 and Comment c (1932).
02 Ibid., at § 306.
93 Ibid., at § 295.
94 Jeppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34 Cal. 2d 11, 206 P. 2d 847 (1949); Johnson v.
Goldberg, 130 Cal. App. 2d 571, 279 P. 2d 131 (1955); Country Club Oil Co. v. Lee, 239
Minn. 148, 58 N.W. 2d 247 (1953); Moran v. Fifteenth Ward Building & Loan Assn.,
131 N.J. Eq. 361, 25 A. 2d 426 (Ch., 1942); Unger v. Chaves, 113 N.E. 2d 753 (Ohio
App., 1953); Erkess v. Eisenthal, 354 Pa. 161, 47 A. 2d 154 (1946); Sidle v. Kaufman,
345 Pa. 549, 29 A. 2d 77 (1942); Major v. Price, 196 Va. 526, 84 S.E. 2d 445 (1954). But
see Blake v. Williams, 208 Ga. 353, 66 S.E. 2d 829 (1951).
95 Albert v. Ford Motor Co., 112 N.J.L. 597, 172 A. 2d 379 (E. & A., 1934); Benedict
v. Harris, 158 Ore. 613, 77 P. 2d 442 (1938).
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of paying insurance premiums,16 or the act of giving a certain notice,97
or the acts of acknowledging a deed and drafting a document,9 8 or the
act of paying off a mortgage,9 9 or the act of tendering goods'00 or a
deed to land. 101 In each of the foregoing cases, where the question
was raised, it appeared to be true that the promisee could have and
would have performed the condition had there been no repudiation.'
Second: Where a condition is a fact under the control of a third
party, a repudiation may induce but cannot be certain to be the cause
of its non-occurrence, and the condition therefore is excused only if it
appears that it probably would have happened had there been no re-
pudiation. In the outstanding case of Friedman v. Decatur Corpora-
tion,'10 3 involving a bilateral contract for the sale of land by the plain-
tiff to the defendant, the defendant's promise to pay the price was
subject to the express condition precedent that plaintiff-seller cause
the property to be zoned for industrial use and that it obtain wharfage
and pipeline privileges for the property from the proper government
officials. The buyer said in substance, "I will pay the price if you
obtain the zoning change and the wharfage and pipeline privileges."
The seller obtained the zoning change and was engaged in efforts to
obtain the grant of wharfage and pipeline privileges when the buyer
repudiated the contract. The seller naturally discontinued its efforts
and the wharfage and pipeline privileges were never granted. The
court referred to the progress which the promisee had made (this in-
cluded the enactment of legislation by the Congress), and said in
effect that defendant's repudiation was the cause of their not being
obtained and that therefore he was liable for breach of contract.
In these cases, where the final control over the fact which consti-
tutes the condition rests in a third party, it usually will be impossible
to learn with certainty whether the condition would have occurred
96 Universal Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Shaw, 139 Tex. 434, 163 S.W. 2d 376 (1942).
97 United States v. Conti, 64 F. Supp. 187 (D. Mass., 1946), aff'd 158 F. 2d 581 (C.C.A.
st).
98 Ashkenazy v. R. M. Bradley & Co., 328 Mass. 242, 103 N.E. 2d 251 (1952).
99 Schilling v. Levin, 328 Mass. 2, 101 N.E. 2d 360 (1951).
100 Bisbee Linseed Corp. v. Paragon Paint & Varnish Corp., 96 F. 2d 464 (C.C.A. 2d,
1938); General Lamps Mfg. Corp. v. Rader, 43 Berks 45 (Pa., 1950).
101 Davis v. Lacy, 121 F. Supp. 246 (E. D. Ky., 1954).
102 Contra: Humphrey v. Showalter, 283 S.W. 2d 91 (Tex. Civ. App., 1955) (the re-
pudiation was held not to excuse the condition; Corbin says: "Both the reasoning of
the court and its decision are clearly erroneous." 4 Corbin, Contracts, S 954, pocket part
(1956)).
103 77 U.S.A.D.C. 326, 135 F. 2d 812 (1943).
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had there been no repudiation. The most that the promisee usually
can show is that the condition probably would have occurred, and
this should be enough to excuse the condition. 04
Third: Where the condition is a fact not under the control of the
promisor and its non-occurrence is a certainty, a repudiation cannot
prevent its occurrence and does not excuse it. A repudiation under
these circumstances has no legal effect. In the outstanding case of
Miller v. Sch'winn, Inc.,10 5 the defendant in substance promised to
buy a tract of land from the plaintiff on the express condition prece-
dent that plaintiff's title was clear. Defendant's plans for the property
fell through and he repudiated the contract. After plaintiff had filed
suit, defendant learned that plaintiff, before the repudiation, had en-
cumbered his title by irrevocably dedicating a six-foot strip of the
land to the Sanitation Commission in order to have sewers installed
as the contract required. This dedication meant that plaintiff's title
was not clear and that the express condition precedent to defendant's
promise could never occur, but it was not prevented or hindered by
the defendant. Judgment was for the defendant. His repudiation was
in no way the cause of the non-occurrence of the condition and ac-
cordingly did not excuse it. He had not committed a breach of con-
tract and was subject to no legal liability: he had repudiated with
impunity.1 6
Fourth: Where the condition is a fact which requires the exertion
of effort by the promisor, a repudiation by him will result in and
cause its non-occurrence, and it accordingly will be excused, appar-
ently without inquiring whether it would have occurred had there
been no repudiation.
In Glazer v. Klughaupt,10 7 an attorney hired his fiancee as his ste-
nographer, promising to pay her $10.00 per week at the rate of $5.00
104 Supporting the view that the condition is excused if the promisee can show that
it probably would have occurred had there been no repudiation: Atlas Trading Corp.
v. S. H. Grossman, Inc., 169 F. 2d 240 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1948); Vermillion v. Marvel Mer-
chandising Co., 314 Ky. 196, 234 S.W. 2d 673 (1950); Corzelius v. Oliver, 148 Tex. 76,
220 S.W. 2d 632 (1949). But cf. National Dairymen Ass'n, Inc. v. Dean Milk Co., 183
F. 2d 349 (C.A. 7th, 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 876, where the court allowed the
promisee to recover without any apparent showing that the condition probably would
have occurred.
105 72 U.S.A.D.C. 282, 113 F. 2d 748 (1940).
106 Other cases of such repudiation with impunity: United States v. Penn Foundry &
Mfg. Co., 337 U.S. 198 (1949), rehearing denied 338 U.S. 840; Arnold v. H. Piper Co.,
319 Ill. App. 91, 48 N.E. 2d 580 (1943); Fratelli Pantanella, S.A. v. International Com-
mercial Corp., 89 N.Y.S. 2d 736 (S. Ct., 1949); Bagnoli v. Cleveland Trust Co., 84 Ohio
App. 170, 79 N.E. 2d 557 (1948); Standard Petroleum Co. v. Janssen, 116 Utah 352, 209
P. 2d 932 (1949).
107 116 N.J.L. 507, 185 Atd. 8 (E. & A., 1936).
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cash per week and the other $5.00 when they were married, for the
purchase of articles for their home. He repudiated the contract to
marry some three years later and she sued for the accumulated salary.
Her rendering of a week's services would create a $10.00 debt, but no
"duty of immediate performance" would exist as to the second $5.00
until the express condition precedent (i.e., their marriage) occurred. 08
The court allowed her to recover saying, in substance, that defendant
should not be permitted to postpone the occurrence of the "con-
tingency" so as to deprive her of her wages. Here the condition of
marriage undoubtedly would have occurred had defendant not re-
pudiated the engagement and his repudiation clearly excused it.
In an even more striking case, "09 the plaintiff rendered engineering
services in connection with the rehabilitation of defendant's graphite
mine and was to be paid $500.00 at once, $500.00 in sixty days, and
$4,000.00 at the rate of $500.00 per month "as soon as the plant is in
successful operation, profitably processing and selling commercial
grade graphite." After plaintiff had performed substantially all of the
services, defendant repudiated. Still later the defendant abandoned
the entire project and it never has been operated successfully. The
court allowed the plaintiff to recover the $4,000.00 without inquiring
whether the plant would have been a success if defendant had perse-
vered: the condition was excused by the repudiation."0
In three of the four cases cited in connection with the presefit sub-
topic,"' the court did not employ the analysis that defendant's prom-
ise was conditional and that the condition had been excused by his
repudiation, but instead said, in substance, that defendant owed an
absolute debt, that the "contingency" related only to the time of pay-
ment and merely postponed it, and that when the "contingency" did
not occur because of defendant's fault, the law would substitute
another time of payment, such as after a reasonable time. According
to a classic statement:
If the parties intend that a debt shall be contingent . . . then it will be so
held by the Court. If, on the contrary, they intend that the debt shall be abso-
lute, and fix upon the future event as a convenient time for payment merely,
108 Rest., Contracts, § 250 and Comment c (1932).
109 North American Graphite Corp. v. Allan, 87 U.S.A.D.C. 154, 184 F. 2d 387 (1950).
110 The innocent party recovered after the repudiation without an apparent showing
that the condition would have occurred had there been no repudiation in: Glover v.
Grubbs, 367 Pa. 257, 80 A. 2d 75 (1951); Caneer v. Martin, 238 S.W. 2d 828 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1951).
"' Glazer v. Klughaupt, North American Graphite Corp. v. Allan, and Caneer v.
Martin.
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as where a drover purchases cattle, promising to pay for them on his return from
market, overlooking the contingency that he may never return, then the debt
will not be contingent; and, if the future event does not happen as contemplated,
the law will require payment to be made within a reasonable time." 2
This was an unsatisfactory analysis, (1) because the drover's re-
turn from market had the characteristics of an express condition
precedent, and, (2) because it was hard to agree that "the law" might
furnish a substituted time for payment. The analysis happily was
rejected by Section 250 of the Restatement of Contracts, in its defi-
nition of a condition precedent as "a fact (other than mere lapse of
time) which, unless excused . . . must exist or occur before a duty of
immediate performance of a promise arises.. . ." Under this definition,
the attorney's promise to pay the accumulated salary, the mining
company's promise to pay the $4,000.00, and the drover's promise to
pay for the cattle, were all conditional promises, being subject to
their respective express conditions precedent, namely, the marriage,
the successful operation of the graphite mine, and the return of the
drover from market. Each of these conditions was susceptible of being
excused by a number of excuses, including repudiation, and upon such
excuse the promisor would become subject to a duty of immediate
performance.
10. A repudiation by the offeror of an irrevocable offer has no
effect on the offer.-An irrevocable offer is not terminated by the offer-
or's repudiation and an acceptance within the proper time therefore
forms a contract. '" A repudiation, however, does not dispense with
acceptance, and failure of the offeree to accept causes the offer to
terminate on its normal expiration date." 4
11. A repudiator who has partly performed a divisible contract may
be both entitled to recover and liable for damages.-The outstanding
case of Carrig v. Gilbert-Varker Corporation"5 involved a divisible
contract for the erection of thirty-five houses. The contract was di-
visible into thirty-five portions, each portion consisting of one house
and its price." 6 The contractor built twenty houses, and then repudi-
ated and refused to build the other fifteen, giving as its reason that it
was losing money. The court held that since the contract was divisi-
112 DeWolfe v. French, 51 Me. 420, 421 (1864).
118 Country Club Oil Co. v. Lee, 239 Minn. 148, 58 N.W. 2d 247 (1953).
114 Kotcher v. Edelblute, 250 N.Y. 178, 164 N.E. 897 (1928).
115 314 Mass. 351, 50 N.E. 2d 59 (1943).
116 Rest., Contracts, S 266 (3) and Comments e and f (1932).
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ble, the repudiator was entitled to the contract price of the twenty
houses it had built, and was liable in damages for breach of contract
as to the fifteen not built, these damages being the difference between
their contract price and what it would cost to have them built by
another contractor. Had this been an entire contract for the thirty-
five houses, the contractor undoubtedly would not have rendered
substantial performance in building only twenty, and undoubtedly
would have committed a material breach in not building the fifteen: it
accordingly would have had no rights upon the contract, and, accord-
ing to a dictum of the court, it would have had no right to recover
upon a quantum meruit. 117
12. The injured party should not continue to perform if such con-
tinuation 'will increase his damages.-The purpose of an award of dam-
ages for breach of contract is to compensate the plaintiff for the harm
caused to him by the defendant, and there is no intent to compensate
him for damages which are readily avoidable by him and which are,
therefore, in effect, self-inflicted. Upon the repudiation of a contract,
it normally will be appropriate for the injured party to discontinue his
own performance, thereby limiting the damages to his loss of profits
plus his expenditures to date."" In the leading case of Rockingham
County v. Luten Bridge Co.,"' the county repudiated a contract for
the construction of a bridge (having abandoned the plan for building
a road which was to cross the bridge) at a time when the contractor
had expended only $1,900.00. If the contractor had discontinued work
then and sued for damages, it would have recovered its prospective
profits on the whole job plus $1,900.00,12° but instead it continued to
build the unwanted bridge and later sued for $18,301.07 for work
done. The court held that it should recover its prospective profits on
the whole job plus the $1,900.00: the difference became the builder's
loss.
The innocent party may continue his performance, however,
where to do so will not increase the damages, as where he has pro-
ceeded so far in the manufacture of goods for the repudiator that dis-
continuation would produce loss,12' or where discontinuation would
117 Under Section 357 (1) of the Restatement, the contractor apparently would have
been denied restitution.
118 Rest., Contracts, § 336 (1932); Uniform Sales Act § 64 (4).
119 35 F. 2d 301 (C.C.A. 4th, 1929).
120 Rest., Contracts, § 346 (2) (1932).
121 Lannom Mfg. Co. v. Strauss Co., 235 Iowa 97, 15 N.W. 2d 899 (1944).
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interfere excessively with a contract which he has with a third party.122
13. Damages in an action for anticipatory breach.-The governing
principle is set forth in Section 338 of the Restatement of Contracts:
The rules for determining the damages recoverable for an anticipatory breach
are the same as in the case of a breach at the time fixed for performance.
In a case where the trial takes place after the date fixed for per-
formance, the determination of damages is normally the same in a case
of anticipatory breach as in a case of actual breach. 123
If, however, the trial occurs before the date fixed for performance,
and if the case is one where the measure of damages is the difference
between the contract price and the market value (i.e., market value at
date for performance), then a peculiar problem is presented: it be-
comes necessary to know the future value of the property in question.
In a striking case,'124 tried in 1930 and involving a contract for the sale
of land to be performed in 1936, the court accepted the 1930 value as
"the best prediction possible," and as valid proof, of the 1936 value. 25
In another case, involving a three-year contract for hops, as to which
there was an established futures market, the court affirmed a calcula-
tion of damages based upon the price, at the time of the repudiation,
of futures contracts for the three specified years. 26
It has already been suggested that a repudiator is no favorite of the
law, and it may be that this attitude may cause a court to award dam-
ages against him on evidence which might not be sufficient in the case
of an unwilful contract breaker. For example, a clothing retailer re-
covered against a repudiating wholesaler on the basis that the plaintiff
had bought thirty-four suits for resale at a 661% markup; 27 a seller
of scrap iron was allowed to recover the same percentage of profit on
.12 Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35 Cal. 2d 607, 220 P. 2d 729 (1950).
123 Compania Engraw Commercial E. Industrial S. A. v. Schenley Distillers Corp.,
181 F. 2d 876 (C.A. 9th, 1950) (injured party recovered the difference between the
contract price of goods and their market value on the date fixed for performance);
David J. Joseph Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 345 (Ct. CI., 1949) (injured party
recovered for loss of profits on goods which repudiator had contracted to buy); Hill's,
Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 41 Wash. 2d 42, 246 P. 2d 1099 (1952) (injured party
recovered for loss of profits on goods which repudiator had contracted to sell).
124 In re Marshall's Garage, Inc., 63 F. 2d 759 (C.C.A. 2d, 1933) (This was a case of
bankruptcy, which is not a repudiation but which may have some similar consequences.
Rest., Contracts, § 324 (1932)).
125 Cf. Parker v. King, 68 Ga. App. 672, 23 S.E. 2d 575 (1942).
120 Renner Co. v. McNeff Bros., 102 F. 2d 664 (C.C.A. 6th, 1939), cert. denied 308
U.S. 576.
127 Hill's, Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 41 Wash. 2d 42, 246 P. 2d 1099 (1952).
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the repudiated part of the contract as it had made on the tonnage de-
livered; 2 and a buyer of 60,000 cases of wine to be delivered over a
three-year period, it appearing that such wine was not readily obtain-
able on the market, was allowed to recover $72,687.51, as its "prospec-
tive net profits which it would have made in the ordinary course of
business .... "129
14. Repudiation by a seller of goods does not require the buyer to
buy on the market for the purpose of lessening his damages.-As was
seen in the preceding section, the innocent party's damages are com-
puted by the values on the date for performance and not on the date
of the repudiation. After the date for performance has passed, it may
appear that on certain dates between the repudiation and the date for
performance, the innocent party might have entered into a favorable
contract with a third party for the same performance and thereby
might have lessened his damages. For example, in the outstanding case
of Reliance Cooperage Corporation v. Treat,130 the defendant in July
contracted to deliver barrel staves to plaintiff by December 31 at the
price of $450.00 per thousand. In August, the defendant repudiated,
and by December 31, the market price of staves was as much as
$750.00 per thousand. The market prices were approximately $450.00
in August, $525.00 in September, and $625.00 in December. The
court held that the buyer had not been required to buy staves on the
market, even though it developed that it thereby would have suffered
less damages, citing such reasons as (1) the innocent party should not
be required to take the risks involved, and (2) "Any effort to convert
the doctrine [of anticipatory breach] into one for the benefit of the
party who, without legal excuse, has renounced his agreement should
be resisted."'18'
15. Urging the repudiator to perform does not nullify the repudia-
tion.-A natural thing for the injured party to do when the other
party repudiates is to urge him to perform the contract as made. Ac-
cording to expressions found in some older, and particularly English,
cases, such urging is a refusal to "accept" the repudiation and operates
to nullify it.132 But the recent American cases follow the rule of Sec-
128 David J. Joseph Co. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 345 (Ct. CI., 1949).
129 Bercut v. Park, Benziger & Co., 150 F. 2d 731, 732 (C.C.A. 9th, 1945).
130 195 F. 2d 977 (C.A. 8th, 1952), and, to the same effect, Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co.
v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Cal., 1948), judgment reinstated 188 F. 2d 569 (C.A. 9th,
1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 820, cert. denied 344 U.S. 829 (1952).
131 195 F. 2d 977, 983.
132 5 Williston, Contracts 5 1333 (rev. ed., 1937).
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tion 320 of the Restatement of Contracts, and hold that the injured
party may urge performance and, if the repudiator does not retract,
may proceed to sue for anticipatory breach. 8 '
16. A written repudiation may render an oral contract enforceable
under the Statute of Frauds.-The Statute of Frauds provides that no
action may be maintained upon certain types of oral contracts, and
therefore an oral contract within the Statute may be repudiated orally
with impunity.8 4 A written repudiation, however, which sufficiently
establishes the existence and sets forth the terms of the repudiated con-
tract, may constitute a "memorandum or note thereof" and render the
contract enforceable. 8 5
17. The repudiation of a contract containing an arbitration clause
will not affect the repudiator's rights to arbitration.-The outstanding
case of Kulukundis Shipping Co., S. A. v. Amtorg Trading Corpora-
tion 8 ' involved a charter party. Amtorg repudiated by denying that a
contract existed. In a libel filed by Kulukundis, Amtorg moved for a
stay of the libel proceedings under Section 3 of the United States
Arbitration Act,137 which provides in substance that on the applica-
tion of either party, a suit in a federal court shall be stayed, if a writ-
ten contract provides for arbitration, until such arbitration is had. The
question was accordingly presented as to whether Amtorg could
claim the benefit of the arbitration clause in a contract which it had
repudiated. In a scholarly opinion, Judge Jerome Frank said that the
intent of the Congress, as evidenced by the Act, required the court "to
shake off the old judicial hostility to arbitration,' 38 and "to forget the
English attitude,"'-8 9 as portrayed in a House of Lords decision that a
repudiator was not entitled to the benefit of an arbitration clause. 40
Instead, he relied upon Williston's argument that a repudiator "can
138 Renner Co. v. McNeff Bros., 102 F. 2d 664 (C.C.A. 6th, 1939), cert. denied 308
U.S. 576; Jeppi v. Brockman Holding Co., 34 Cal. 2d 11, 206 P. 2d 847 (1949); Carvage
v. Stowell, 115 Vt. 187, 55 A. 2d 188 (1947).
184 Sousa v. First California Co., 101 Cal. App. 2d 533, 225 P. 2d 955 (1950).
135 Sennott v. Cobb's Pedigreed Chicks, Inc., 324 Mass. 9, 84 N.E. 2d 466 (1949).
186 126 F. 2d 978 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942).
18743 Stat. 883 (1925), 9 U.S.C.A. S 3.
138 126 F. 2d 978, 985.
189 Ibid., at 992.
140 Jureidini v. National British & Irish Millers Insurance Co., [1915] A.C. 499. To the
same effect, Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, Ltd. v. Nicolaou, 38 F. Supp. 156 (E. D. La., 1941).
Arbitration was denied a repudiator in The Wilja, 113 F. 2d 646 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940), cert.
denied 311 U.S. 687, but the holding was later explained as being based on the fact that
it would have been impossible to hold the arbitration in the specified place, In re Pahl-
berg Petition, 131 F. 2d 968 (C.C.A. 2d, 1942).
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be held liable only according to the terms of the contract,''4 and
held, since arbitration was provided for in the contract and since the
Act provided for a stay, that the repudiator was entided to the stay
until arbitration had been made on the issue of damages. 142 The con-
gressional policy of supporting arbitration overcame both the ancient
judicial hostility to arbitration and the apparent judicial disrespect for
a repudiator.
18. A repudiation may give the injured party two periods for filing
suit under the Statute of Limitations.-According to the doctrine of
anticipatory breach, a repudiation gives the injured party an imme-
diate right of action for breach of contract. Under the American rule,
a repudiation by mail is operative at the time and place of mailing, and
no "acceptance" of the repudiation. by the injured party is necessary
to make it effective. 43 The Statute of Limitations applicable to an
action for breach of contract starts to run when the repudiation
occurs and permits suit until the statutory period has expired.
If the injured party does not sue for anticipatory breach, he ac-
quires another right of action for breach of contract if performance is
not rendered on the due date. If this right of action for the actual
breach arises before the statute has run on the cause of action for antic-
ipatory breach, the injured party presumably may sue on either one.
In the decided cases which have been seen, however, the action for
the actual breach was filed, and maintained successfully, after the
statute had run on the right of action for anticipatory breach: the in-
jured party had enjoyed the benefit of two statutory periods for filing
suit. 44
IV. SUMMARY
The subject of repudiation of contract has been discussed as con-
sisting of two parts, namely, what constitutes a repudiation and what
are its consequences.
A repudiation is a manifestation, by spoken or written words or by
141 6 Williston, Contracts, p. 5373 (rev. ed., 1937).
142 Accord: Batter Building Materials Co. v. Kirschner, 142 Conn. 1, 110 A. 2d 464
(1954).
143 Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Kansas City Fibre Box Co., 35 F. 2d 822 (C.C.A. 6th,
1929), cert. denied 281 U.S. 730 (1930); Rest., Contracts, S 321. Contra: National Life
Co. v. Volverton, 163 S.W. 2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App., 1942).
144 St. Regis Sales Corp. v. Wilson Cabinet Co., 47 Del. 261, 90 A. 2d 488 (Super. Ct.,
1952); Old Ladies Home Ass'n v. Hall, 212 Miss. 67, 52 So. 2d 650 (1951); Slaughter v.
Roark, 244 S.W. 2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App., 1951); Main v. Hopkins, 229 S.W. 2d 820
(Tex. Civ. App., 1950); Simpson v. Scott, 189 Va. 392, 53 S.E. 2d 21 (1949).
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conduct of various kinds, that the repudiator wilfully is going to com-
mit a breach of contract in the future: it is an unlawful act and a
repudiator is no favorite of the law.
The consequences of a repudiation have been arranged under eight-
een headings:
1. The Injured Party May Sue for Damages at Once under the Doc-
trine of Anticipatory Breach
2. The Injured Party May Be Given Equitable Relief
3. The Injured Party May Be Given a Declaratory Judgment
4. The Repudiation Will Be Nullified if the Repudiator Retracts It
5. The Duties of Both Parties under the Contract May Become Dis-
charged by a Rescission by Partially Reluctant Mutual Assent
6. If the Contract Is So Discharged by a Rescission by Partially Re-
luctant Mutual Assent, Restitution for Benefits Conferred May
Be Obtained by the Injured Party and Possibly by the Repudiator
7. The Duties of the Injured Party Alone May Become Discharged
8. The Injured Party, whose Duties under the Contract Have Been
Discharged, May Nevertheless Recover Damages from the Re-
pudiator
9. The Repudiation May Excuse a Condition
10. A Repudiation by the Offeror of an Irrevocable Offer Has No
Effect on the Offer
11. A Repudiator Who Has Partly Performed a Divisible Contract
May Be Both Entitled to Recover and Liable for Damages
12. The Injured Party Should Not Continue To Perform if Such
Continuation Will Increase His Damages
13. Damages in an Action for Anticipatory Breach
14. Repudiation by a Seller of Goods Does Not Require the Buyer
To Buy on the Market for the Purpose of Lessening His Dam-
ages
15. Urging the Repudiator To Perform Does Not Nullify the Re-
pudiation
16. A Written Repudiation May Render an Oral Contract Enforce-
able under the Statute of Frauds
17. The Repudiation of a Contract Containing an Arbitration Clause
Will Not Affect the Repudiator's Rights to Arbitration
18. A Repudiation May Give the Injured Party Two Periods for Fil-
ing Suit under the Statute of Limitations
